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Abstract 
 Major League Soccer (MLS) is the highest caliber soccer league in the United States. The 
league, formed in 1995, has grown from just ten teams to twenty-four, with more on the way. 
The league has rebounded from a period of losses in the early 2000s and has established new 
fan bases through the usage of the designated player rule. This paper analyzes the current 
situation of MLS, as of the spring of 2019, and proposes a strategic recommendation. The 
current situation of MLS is evaluated using SWOT and PEST tools, and the strategic 
recommendation is created based on MLS’s competitive advantages and resources. 
 
 MLS gets its revenue in different ways, including the sale of broadcasting rights, 
merchandise sales, ticket sales, expansion fees, and brand sponsorship deals. It has a 
comparative advantage with United States soccer talent, and a distinctive competency at 
establishing lasting brand sponsorship deals. This has pushed MLS into a position to compete not 
only with United States sporting leagues, but also international soccer leagues. Some of the 
weaknesses the MLS has are its low salary caps, which restrict clubs from recruiting the best 
talent, and its reliance on the standard United States talent progression system, which sees 
athletes move from club teams or high school teams into college teams and finally to a draft. 
 
 With the 2026 World Cup being hosted in the Americas, the MLS is in a great position to 
capitalize on growing interest in soccer in the United States. They face heavy threats from 
international soccer organizations like the English Premier League, who have secured 
broadcasting deals to United States viewers. 
 
 The strategic recommendation for MLS is to capitalize on youth soccer talent in the 
United States by investing heavily in the academy teams under each MLS team. This will allow 
the MLS to gain revenue by selling youth talent to foreign clubs, and then use this new revenue 
to increase the salary cap and draw more talent. This strategy is easy to monitor, since players 
from academies will either have more playing time than previous college players or not. This will 
translate to higher profile sales, but if it doesn’t there is a backup plan for MLS to pursue. 
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Introduction 
 Professional soccer has been around in the United States since 1967. However, it had 
seen painstakingly slow growth until the rise of Major League Soccer (MLS )in the early 2000s. 
MLS has grown American professional soccer from just ten teams in 1995 to now twenty-four 
teams. With a goal of developing soccer popularity in the United States, MLS survived a rough 
period through a commitment to limit expensive signings and commit to a sound marketing 
strategy. 
 
 MLS has succeeded where no other soccer league could, but it sits at a crossroads. The 
league has been staying afloat through the recruitment of new expansion teams, which pay huge 
initiation fees. However, MLS is approaching twenty-six teams, and there are only a few more 
cities that can provide dedicated fan bases. Despite the growing popularity of soccer in the 
United States, the failure to develop talented players in the United States is showing through the 
weak United States National team. If MLS wants to become profitable, it’s time for a change. 
 
History 
 MLS began in February 1995 after the United States made a pledge to FIFA to restart a 
professional league in order to host the 1994 World Cup (United States District Court, 2000). At 
first, the league held promise; it started with ten teams and saw an early expansion to twelve 
teams in 1998. It had also managed to recruit some star players from the 1994 World Cup such 
as Alexi Lalas. 
 
 Unfortunately, MLS hit a rough period in 1999. In the 1998 World Cup, the United States 
National team lost every game and finished last. This made the talent in MLS look weak, and the 
league took a hit in attendance, which was already low. It was forced to drop back to ten teams 
in 2002 (Bradley, 2000). According to a New York Times article, MLS had lost over $300 million 
dollars by 2005 (Eligon, 2005). 
 
 The league made a resurgence starting in 2007. MLS introduced a new rule called the 
Designated Player Rule, which allowed foreign players to be purchased by MLS teams, despite 
the small salary cap. These players were outside of the MLS salary cap, which allowed teams to 
spend heavily on their own to land good players. This rule brought in players like David Beckham, 
and reignited fanbases. This in turn led to a movement for MLS teams to construct their own 
stadiums, allowing them to control ticket prices and therefore develop brand deals. For example, 
Adidas signed a ten-year $150 million sponsorship with MLS in 2005, keeping MLS afloat and 
allowing it to expand further (Eligon, 2005). 
 
Current MLS Overview 
 Today, MLS operates under an investor-operator model. As opposed to other United 
States sports leagues, where the owners compete to have resources and build their own brands, 
all of the MLS investor-operators are in the same entity, MLS. Therefore, all profits from all 
teams are divided equally. MLS can be broken down into the following entities. 
 
Investor-Operators 
 Investor-operators are entitled to operate one of the teams in MLS. They earn certain 
revenues directly, such as local broadcasting deals, merchandise sold in the stadium, local 
sponsorship deals, and parking and food revenue from the stadium. The investor-operators also 
pay the designated player salaries, stadium expenses, player development expenses, and travel 
expenses. For other revenues, MLS gets a cut. For example, MLS gets 30% of ticket sales and 
about 35% on player transfer fees (Krasny, 2017). 
 
Teams 
 Each MLS team falls under both the MLS and an investor-operator. The MLS pays the 
player salaries as well as targeted allocation money and general allocation money. The investor-
operator covers the rest. Each team consists of a coaching staff and a roster, and often times an 
academy to develop younger players (Krasny, 2017). 
 
Major League Soccer LLC 
 MLS is an LLC operated by the same investors owning teams. That is, at the end of the 
day, the investor-operators see the profits from both the MLS and their respective teams. The 
reason some of the profits are pushed out from the MLS level is to create parity in the league. 
This setup allows failing MLS teams to stay on their feet and ensures that the teams have equal 
levels of talent. This strategy was essential to building the league, and without it, some of the 
teams wouldn’t have survived (Krasny, 2017). 
 
Soccer United Marketing 
 MLS makes money by selling soccer. Most money the league receives is from brand deals, 
broadcasting rights, and expansion fees. The league could be earning around $300 million 
annually according to some estimates (Krasny, 2017). Also, a Forbes article showed that ten 
teams were operating at profit (Forbes, 2016). Since ticket sales are hard to estimate, most of 
the estimation can be realized from these big brand deals. 
 
 This is where Soccer United Marketing comes in. It is an advertising entity under MLS that 
organizes advertising deals, tournaments, and even advertises and coordinates some United 
States National team games. Soccer United Marketing is valued at around $800 million, making it 
extremely useful to MLS. One example of its usefulness would be when it organized the 
Superliga games between Mexican soccer teams and MLS soccer teams. This offered MLS its first 
opportunity to test itself against stiffer competition and prove its talent. 
 
Providence Equity Partners 
 Providence Equity Partners owns 20% of Soccer United Marketing, and sees profits from 
it, allowing outsiders to estimate the value of Soccer United Marketing, and gain insight to brand 
deals for MLS. MLS is looking to buy back its stake in Soccer United Marketing, which is a good 
sign that the league is starting to turn profits and paying off its debt (Krasny, 2017). 
 
 
Figure 1: MLS has diverse revenue streams and SUM and other sponsors may be worth much more (Krasny, 2017).  
 
Situation Analysis 
Internal Analysis 
Key Resources 
 MLS is sitting on potential gold mine of human capital. The United States has a large 
population in comparison to European countries and has a long history of producing elite 
athletes. MLS depends on this local talent to drive its popularity and sales. They cannot improve 
the quality of soccer as a form of entertainment without improving the skill levels of MLS players. 
They attempted to in the past, with odd rules and a countdown clock. The goals of these were to 
increase scoring and therefore excitement, but they backfired greatly and during this period of 
experimentation in the early 2000s, the league saw decreased attendance. With the introduction 
of designated players, as mentioned earlier, the overall talent of MLS increased, and so did 
attendance. Therefore, MLS invests heavily into training and healing programs, so these athletes 
can continue to perform. 
 
Competitive Advantage 
 MLS has a competitive advantage over other soccer leagues. This is due to a few key 
differentiators in resources and structure as well as some distinctive competencies. These have 
combined to make MLS one of the major United States professional sporting organizations and 
have ensured its longevity to this point. 
  
 The highlight differentiator for MLS is Soccer United Marketing (SUM). This organization 
under MLS ensures that the goal of the league remains consistent, and that goal is to grow 
soccer as a sport in the United States. By keeping the MLS investors as partners rather than 
rivals, the MLS can continue to expand. In a sense, SUM is the current revenue powerhouse for 
MLS. The organization has landed brand deals and broadcasting rights sales, which make up the 
most significant part of MLS revenue. Furthermore, due to the successful marketing under SUM, 
new investors keep joining MLS. These investor-join fees are now $150 million when they used 
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to be $10 million in the early 2000s (Krasny, 2017). These fees, from most accounts, are 
speculated to be used to pay back the massive debt incurred in MLS’s early days. The SUM’s 
abilities are a distinctive competency for the MLS with regards to other soccer leagues around 
the world. 
 
 
Figure 2: MLS gains massive revenue from expansion fees (Krasny, 2017) 
 
 Again, one comparative advantage for MLS is its access to local United States talent. So 
far it has utilized this talent to develop decent players who will play for low salaries and yet 
produce entertaining matches. This model allowed parity within the league. This access to talent 
has the potential to be utilized differently in the future and could provide huge profits for MLS. 
 
 By keeping salaries low, the MLS was able to add the Designated Player Rule, which 
allows international players to be recruited for larger salaries (Lansley, 2006). This rule, coupled 
with the marketing from SUM has revitalized MLS’s popularity, and therefore draws immediate 
profits to MLS. This rule also serves as a reason for players to join the league too. Even though 
they aren’t payed as much, it’s an attainable goal to play in MLS, and that player would get to 
play with or against legends like Zlatan Ibrahimović. 
 
Strengths 
 MLS has strengths in marketing and stability thanks to its competitive advantages in 
Soccer United Marketing and its investor-operator strategy. It has utilized these strengths to 
provide exciting soccer entertainment to the United States, and due to its featuring of 
international superstars, it has attracted the attention of soccer viewers worldwide. Because the 
MLS season is from March to October, international viewers have more of an opportunity to 
watch it since international clubs play in the winter months. 
 
Weaknesses 
 Unfortunately, due to the necessity to save money to keep the league afloat, MLS cannot 
offer high salaries to United States players. It also does not waste money on developing these 
players more than necessary. These two strategies, which save money in the short run, could 
prove detrimental to the league. The failure to develop local talent is showing, and eventually 
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MLS will stop expanding. This means that MLS will have to keep relying on investors to buy 
foreign talent to maintain viewer interest. 
 
 This weakness is glaring, as international clubs such as Barcelona can afford to purchase 
expensive players by selling and loaning their academy players to other teams. If MLS wants to 
keep growing, it will eventually have to enter tougher competition, and it needs cash to do it if 
talent isn’t developed soon. 
 
External Analysis 
PEST Factors 
Political 
 MLS isn’t usually affected by political issues like other organizations. However, there are 
strong ties in other countries between soccer teams and government, with teams like Barcelona 
being attached to the movement for Catalan independence from Spain (Burns, 2017). It’s 
important to realize that because soccer an international sport, it can, like the Olympics, have 
political significance. For example, the United States hard push to host the World Cup in 2026 
met resistance because of the Trump administration, and this competition offers a great 
marketing opportunity for MLS (Rogers, 2018). 
 
Economic 
 Economic trends typically haven’t directly harmed MLS, since it relies on human capital as 
a its main resource. Because MLS has been expanding, lower property values from 2008 thru 
2010 served well for building stadiums and were even marketed as attractions to bring 
surrounding property values back up (Caloway, 2017). However, economic trends could cause 
brand deals to turn sour, so SUM needs to be careful to organize deals during bright economic 
times. 
 
Social 
 Soccer has been growing in popularity with millennials according to a Gallup research poll 
(Serrano, 2018). Unfortunately, the same study shows that those under eighteen are favoring it 
less. This trend could prove detrimental to MLS in future years, so MLS should have a strategy for 
maintaining its fanbase. 
 
Technology 
 As Internet technology continues to grow, so will the number of illegal streams hosting 
MLS games. Luckily, the MLS is not alone in this problem since it pertains to all broadcasts. It 
does mean that MLS will receive less from broadcast sales if TV networks begin to lower prices to 
compete with streams. 
  
Porter’s Five Forces 
Threat of New Entrants 
 The threat of new entrants into the sport’s entertainment industry is relatively low. 
Threats can be identified quickly since it takes massive amounts of capital to create a sports 
league at the top of a national division. However, in entertainment, there are a whole lot of new 
entrants every day, fighting for the same viewers as MLS. 
  
Threat of Substitutes 
 The threat of substitutes is extremely high and is what the MLS focuses on highest 
besides direct competition. In the United States, football, baseball, basketball, and hockey are 
valid substitutes for soccer, and have each had a longer professional presence in the United 
States. Other forms of entertainment, like movies or television series are also good substitutes 
for sporting events, especially if the home team is doing poorly! 
  
Bargaining Power of Suppliers 
 Bargaining power of suppliers is lower in sports entertainment and for the MLS. Each 
team has its own stadium at this point, allowing the MLS to regulate its own pricing on tickets. 
There are also plenty of providers and broadcasters vying for MLS rights, so lucrative broadcast 
deals are expected. 
 
Bargaining power of Consumers 
 The bargaining power of consumers is huge for all sports organizations. There are plenty 
of free sources of entertainment, and if a customer only wants to watch the highlights of an MLS 
game all he or she needs to do is look for a video on YouTube which might not even be from a 
legal broadcaster.  
  
Competitors 
 The competitors of MLS are a high threat. MLS is competing with other United States 
leagues such as the United Soccer League (USL) for expansions, despite MLS being considered 
the highest division of soccer in the United States so far. Unlike with other sporting 
organizations, MLS competes internationally for viewers with the higher tier leagues such as the 
German Bundesliga, the Spanish La Liga, the French Ligue 1, and the English Premier League. So 
far, these competitors have been able to outclass MLS in talent and overall revenue, although 
they cannot offer the same stability as MLS. However, owning a European soccer club is lucrative 
for businesses looking to advertise internationally, and therefore if a team is struggling financially 
often there are buyers lined up (Lazurus, 2015). 
 
Opportunities 
 Again, the biggest opportunity available to MLS is their easy access to a large population, 
and therefore elite athletes. Although they are vying for the same athletes as other sports in 
America, with the growing popularity of the sport, there should be more than enough talented 
players to place into development academies. These players can then be sold for high transfer 
prices to other clubs. 
 
 MLS has a golden marketing opportunity coming up for the World Cup 2026. Using SUM 
to market and schedule games in MLS stadiums during the competition will not only result in 
revenue for the investor-operators, but also heightened interest in MLS. Furthermore, if players 
from MLS make a good run during the cup, more viewers may be attracted to watching MLS. 
 Threats 
 The greatest threat to MLS is the looming period of non-expansion. MLS has stayed afloat 
with investor-operator entrance fees. When the league gets to large, which could approach 
sooner than expected, MLS will have to implement a new strategy to remain financially stable. 
Also, if United States talent keeps getting recruited to join foreign club academies, MLS will miss 
out on valuable transfer money it could use to grow the league. 
 
 Again, MLS faces stiff competition for viewers both internationally and nationally, which 
makes it hard to change strategies. One big risk could lead to a disaster like the rule changes in 
the early 2000s mentioned earlier. Without establishing and maintaining loyal fanbases, United 
States soccer fans could easily switch to watching European soccer on cable. 
 
Strategic Goals for MLS 
Grow Talent 
 MLS needs talent to compete on the worldwide stage. Currently, the United States is 
losing talented soccer players to European academies because MLS academies cannot offer the 
same experience. The future of MLS depends on its academy players. Fortunately, the academies 
in MLS have seen success over the traditional high school to college to draft methodology 
(Rahman, 2018). This is a clear signal to ramp up academy investments. 
 
Gain International Viewers 
 If MLS stops gaining popularity in the United States, as evidenced by the Gallup poll, 
catering to foreign audiences could prove fruitful (Serrano, 2018). MLS has restrictions on the 
number of foreign players allowed on each team, along with the salary cap. This basically leaves 
only the designated player role as an outlet to cater to foreign viewers. Again, the designated 
player can be payed anything because he does not have to obey the salary cap. These designated 
players’ loyal fans follow from all countries to watch MLS. 
 
Attract Fans from Other United States Sports 
 In the early 2000s, MLS used its marketing prowess with SUM to promote United States 
soccer. MLS has been structured to offer investor-operators parity, so they all share the same 
goal of promoting soccer. Unfortunately, United States viewers are always looking towards 
excitement, and it has been a while since MLS introduced the designated player rule. While the 
rule still allows for new giant signings, those are rare and fail to excite fanbases as they once had. 
MLS will have to experiment to keep growing its United States fanbase. 
 
Strategic Alternatives 
First Alternative: Invest in Better Youth Scouting and Coaching 
 MLS gets immediate revenue by recruiting older, famous, foreign players to fill 
designated player roles. These signings boost interest in the league for a short time, but in doing 
so MLS directly compensates its competitors with transfer fees. In other words, it’s a double-
edged sword that in the future will not be sustainable. 
 
 To gain a long-term investment, MLS should move from investing in foreign players to 
building its academies. The MLS teams with the best academies, like the New York Red Bulls, 
Philadelphia Union and Real Salt Lake have seen boosts to their teams from academy players. 
This model is also proven to be profitable. Foreign clubs like Ajax in the Netherlands have been 
revitalized by the sale of expensive academy players to bigger clubs. This hurts their competitors 
financially while allowing them to go and buy better players (Planet Football, 2019). 
  
Second Alternative: Raise the Salary Cap Immediately 
 One alternative to immediately boost talent would be to raise the salary cap from $3.845 
million to $10 million. For comparison, the English Premier League “cap” is around $75 million 
(Sale, 2016). This raise in salary would allow MLS to recruit a few elite athletes to its academies 
since there is a chance at a high salary. 
 
Third Alternative: Remove Foreign Player Restrictions 
 Removing foreign player restrictions would come at the cost of developing local talent 
but could save MLS money by allowing the teams to recruit ultimately better talent for the same 
price. This would increase foreign viewership undoubtedly and could bring MLS into competition 
with Central and South American clubs again for friendly games. 
 
Evaluating Alternatives 
 The first alternative grants MLS an avenue for developing long term channels for profit. 
Something it desperately needs after the investors have spent so much on new infrastructure 
and repaying the debts from past years. Development on these long-term investments could 
serve to draw more expansion teams in, since there will be a promise of value from other MLS 
teams selling their players to foreign teams. Remember, MLS splits about 35% of transfer fees 
evenly between the investor-operators. 
 
 The second alternative allows MLS an easy route to elite talent but destroys parity within 
the league. If a trend in increased cap happened to soon, richer clubs would be able to finance 
better teams faster than others and therefore dominate MLS. This effect can be seen in English 
Premier League, where the top six teams are always the top six teams. While this works in 
England because of the smaller land area and dedicated fanbase, it would not work in the 
Americas where the dominant teams would be on the costs. This would isolate fanbases and de-
popularize soccer in the United States. 
 
 The third alternative is a good one for gaining revenue from foreign viewers. It would also 
bring MLS to the world stage and could allow for cheaper talent. Unfortunately, it could lead to a 
loss in viewership in the United States due to a lack of local players. It would also signify a 
reluctance to develop United States talent, and therefore MLS would be failing in its original goal 
to popularize soccer in the United States. As a backup plan though, it is not a bad idea and MLS 
could transition out of it. 
 
Strategic Recommendation 
Overview 
 MLS should use the first alternative listed above. It’s in the perfect position to draw talent 
to its academies. With success stories like Tyler Adams from the New York Redbull’s academy, 
and promising United States talents like Christian Pulisic leaving for Europe, it’s now or never for 
MLS to begin investing more into developing local talent. As mentioned above, academy players 
are investments for teams. If an MLS club can’t afford to pay one of the talents it trained, it can 
sell it for profit to foreign clubs. 
 
Specifics 
 The primary concern at the MLS organization level would be to set restrictions on MLS 
teams for developing academy players. One such restriction could be that MLS teams must 
roster at least five academy players. This number could gradually be pushed to six or seven in 
future years once the academies start producing real talent. The advantage to this strategy is 
that each MLS team would be responsible for finding coaches and managers for its academy 
teams. This ruins parity, but not as much as raising the salary cap immediately would. Youth 
coaches are much less expensive, and just switching from the high school to college to draft 
model should produce enough talent for this to be worth it. 
 
 To ensure that academies are up to standards, the MLS could facilitate academy 
tournaments with real incentives for the winners. For example, if an MLS team’s academy team 
won one of these tournaments, their division one team would be allowed a playoff spot in the 
postseason. This is a low risk move, since there are already avenues for MLS teams to be 
guaranteed a playoff spot. It would also offer more marketing opportunities for SUM, since these 
tournaments are important to dedicated MLS fans. 
 
 Finally, MLS can measure the success of its academy players. The MLS can view the 
transfer profits from each academy as opposed to the cost of its coaching staff and other costs 
to see if it is raising money or losing money. If it’s raising money, then there’s no harm done. If 
it’s losing money, then the MLS can immediately stop the academy player restriction and end the 
guaranteed playoff spot perk. 
 
Justification 
 The United States has a huge population compared to European countries, but United 
States soccer talent is far behind Europe. This is due to the MLS’s competition with more popular 
and lucrative sports in the United States. For example, an elite athlete who must go to high 
school and college in the United States can achieve far greater salaries by pursuing basketball or 
football than soccer. The greatest youth soccer talents from the United States, such as Christian 
Pulisic, are forced to move to Europe to pursue higher salaries. This is an added cost for elite 
athletes trying to play professional soccer which pushes them into other sports. The MLS must 
invest in its youth academies so that it can develop elite talents on home soil. After developing a 
few talented players, the MLS could sell talented players for a premium to foreign clubs. For 
example, the formerly mentioned Christian Pulisic was purchased from a German club for $73 
million, which is almost as much as the MLS makes annually from broadcasting rights. With this 
kind of money, the MLS will eventually be able to raise its salary cap and afford to provide high 
salaries to elite United States athletes. By ensuring that each team has an elite academy, MLS 
can maintain the parity in the league that they need to popularize it with United States fans. 
 
Implementation Plan 
 These changes should happen at the beginning of the 2020 season. This allows the MLS 
teams six years to develop talent in their academies, which is just enough to develop United 
States soccer players before the World Cup in 2026 since academy players are usually recruited 
around fourteen to fifteen years old (Rahman, 2018).  If the United States National team were to 
make a good run into the World Cup, the MLS could take credit, and renew popularity for the 
league in the United States. It’s a wonderful opportunity, and if the national team does poorly it 
won’t matter since they are already bad. 
 
Contingency Plan 
 As a contingency plan, if the new restrictions and rewards don’t show profits coming 
from the academies within five years, MLS could move to slowly removing the foreign player 
restriction. This would allow MLS to piggyback on profits from foreign viewers while it continues 
to develop its academies. Then, after another five years, depending on the talent from the 
academies, MLS could transition back to reinstating the foreign player restrictions and try again. 
 
Conclusion 
 MLS has grown out of the ashes of failed United States soccer leagues, and it is here to 
stay. If it wants to overtake other popular United States sports, however, it must be competitive 
on an international scale. If MLS takes advantage of its comparative advantage in access for elite 
talent by improving its academies, it could gradually raise its salary cap and compete with the 
best clubs worldwide. MLS has the potential to rocket to the world stage, and it must take 
advantage of this opportunity, especially with a United States hosted World Cup quickly 
approaching. 
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